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INTRODUCTION
The concept of "social responsibility" is quite broad, and, in the
case of a corporation, could include such diverse issues as its
relationship with: (1) its customers; (2) its employees (past and present);
(3) its shareholders; (4) its competitors; and/or (5) the community or
communities which it affects. Jewish law pervasively impacts corporate
conduct, but does so without positing any distinct doctrinal rules
pertaining to corporations. Instead, the foci of Jewish law are the
individual, on the one hand, and the community as a whole, on the other.
By restricting the conduct of individuals - such as those who serve as a
corporation's employees, managers, directors and shareholders - Jewish
law controls corporate conduct from within. By authorizing and
requiring communally imposed regulation, Jewish law controls
corporate conduct from without.
A thorough exploration of the many Jewish law precepts that apply
to commerce would require far more than the relatively few pages
allotted for this paper. Our more modest intentions, therefore, are to
survey some of the principal ways in which the rules Jewish law
imposes on individuals and communities affect business ethics,
generally, and then to examine whether the corporate context presents
any unique questions.
Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Chair of the Jewish Law
Association (2000-02); Wicklander Chair for Professional Ethics (2000-01); Chair,
Association of American Law Schools' Section on Jewish Law (1988-89); B.A. 1974,
Princeton University; J.D., 1978, Yale Law School; Rabbinic Degree, 1983, Beth
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PART I: RULES REGARDING INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES
Even if a corporation is a separate legal entity, a question which is
subject to considerable dispute as a matter of Jewish law, it must
perforce act through individual human agents. Jewish law imposes
important constraints on what such individuals may and must do. For
convenience, we will separate Jewish law's rules regarding an
individual's moral duties into three sets: (1) those that relate to the moral
character of one's own independent conduct; (2) those that pertain to
one's relationship to the wrongful conduct of others; and (3) those that
affirmatively require one to help others.
Before mentioning specific Jewish law rules, it is critical to note
just a few foundational propositions.' First, one axiom of Jewish law is
that the Almighty communicated with Moses at Mount Sinai and
transmitted commandments and data, some of which were to be written
into the Pentateuch and some of which, comprising the Oral Tradition,
were to be transmitted orally from generation to generation.' The Oral
Tradition included not only definitive interpretations of certain
Pentateuchal verses but also principles through which other verses were
to be construed.3 The Talmudic interpretation of the Pentateuch, and not
the Pentateuch's literal language, is deemed the authoritative biblical
law, as supplemented by the Oral Tradition. In addition to biblical law,
Jewish law also comprises: (1) rabbinic enactments; (2) communal
legislation; (3) to a certain extent, the secular law of the host country in
which Jews find themselves ("Dina de-Malkhuta Dina"); and (4)
commercially established customs ("Minhag ha-Soharim").4  The
detailed application of the last two processes is subject to debate and,
except where otherwise indicated, this article does not take them into
account. Second, even when Jewish law imposes an obligation, there is
typically a limit as to the cost - in terms of money or physical risk - that
1. For a discussion of these principles, see generally Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish
Law: Duties of the Intellect, I U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 386 (2003).
2. Id. at 386.
3. Id. at 387.
4. For a discussion of Dina de-Malkhuta Dina and Minhag ha-Soharim, see
Steven H. Resnicoff, Bankruptcy - A Viable Halachic Option?, XXIV J. HALACHA &
CONTEMP. Soc'Y 5 (Fall 1992).
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a person must expend in order to comply.' Consideration of these
parameters is also beyond our present scope.
Rules regarding an individual's own independent conduct
The Torah requires a person to emulate the Creator,6 to be holy
because the Almighty is holy,7 and to do "the right and the good.",8 In
addition to the obvious proscriptions against cheating, 9 stealing,'0 or
lying," Jewish law contains a comprehensive set of sophisticated and
nuanced prescriptions as to morally acceptable behavior. Consider, for
example, commercial marketing practices. Jewish law not only
specifically proscribes misleading methods of displaying or advertising
goods, but actually requires the disclosure of known defects.' 2 Jewish
law entirely rejects the common law maxim of caveat emptor.13
Moreover, if, after a sale is consummated, a purchaser discovers that
there were pre-existing defects, he or she is entitled to rescind the sale
even if the seller had been totally unaware of the defects.14
In fact, under Jewish law, even if a buyer executes in advance a
5. These limitations are discussed in Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law
Perspectives on Suicide and Physician-Assisted Dying, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 289, 297-
301 (1998-99).
6. See MAIMONIDES, Hilkhot De 'ot, MISHNEH TORAH 1:6 (Heb.); AARON LEVINE,
CASE STUDIES IN JEWISH BUSINESS ETHICS 184-85 (Ktav Publishing House Inc. 2000).
7. Leviticus 19:2.
8. Deuteronomy 12:28.
9. See YOSEF CARO, Hoshen Mishpat, Shulhan Arukh, 228:6-20, 231; SOLOMON
GANZFRIED, CODE OF JEWISH LAW 72 (Hyman E. Goldin, trans., Hebrew Publishing Co.
ann. rev. ed. 1998) (1993).
10. Leviticus 19:11.
11. Exodus 23:7.
12. BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME 221-74
(Norman Lamm ed., Ktav Publishing House, Inc. 2000); LEVINE, supra note 6, at 33-
38; NAHUM RAKOVER, ETHICS IN THE MARKET PLACE: A JEWISH PERSPECTIVE 31-37
(Library of Jewish Law 2000); Tzvi SPITZ, MISHPATEI HA-TORAH II, at 42-45, 80-82
(Heb.).
13. See RAKOVER, supra note 12 at 32.
14. Id. at 85-88; CARO, supra note 9, at 232:3; YAAKOV AVRAHAM COHEN, EMEK
HA-MISHPAT, 287-90 (Heb.).
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general waiver as to any unspecified defects that may subsequently be
discovered, the waiver may be entirely ineffective. 5 Other marketing
practices may be forbidden because they are deemed immoral, even
though they are neither false nor misleading. For example, although
pointing out the advantages of one's own product is permitted, it is
forbidden to belittlingly disparage a competitor's product.
16
Various commercial practices are prohibited because they are
deemed unfair to competitors. For instance, while competition is
generally permitted, 7  direct interference with someone else's
established customers and the opening of a new business in a market
insufficiently robust to permit both the preexisting and new enterprises
to flourish are disallowed. 8  Similarly, raiding another person's
employees or suppliers is also prohibited.' 9 Furthermore, even non-
malicious interference with a person's prospective economic gain may
be proscribed.2 ° Once a third party agrees with a seller as to terms, then,
despite the fact that no binding contract has yet been entered, no other
person is allowed to make a higher offer.2
Jewish law regulates other practices to ensure fairness to others.
For example, creditors cannot harass - verbally or otherwise - those who
are indebted to them. Similarly, an employer must pay employees on
time22 and must treat them with respect. Generally, an employer cannot
fire an employee without cause, even if the employee was hired for an
indefinite duration and, under secular law, would be terminable "at-
will." According to many Jewish law authorities, an employer must
provide severance pay even if there is no contractual provision to that
effect.23
15. CARO, supra note 9, at 232:7.
16. See LEVINE, supra note 6, at 60-67; S. WAGSCHAL, TORAH GUIDE FOR THE
BUSINESSMAN 26 (Feldheim Publishers 1990).
17. WAGSCHAL, supra note 16, at 25-26; see also MEIR TAMARI, WITH ALL YOUR
POSSESSIONS 100-07 (Jason Aronson Inc. ed, 1998) (1987).
18. See TAMARI, supra note 17, at 107-09; LEVINE, supra note 6, at 204, 331.
19. AVROHOM EHRMAN, JOURNEY TO VIRTUE 397 (Artscroll 2002).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. WAGSCHAL, supra note 16, at 34-37.
23. TAMARI, supra note 17, at 144-45 (discussing authorities); David J. Schnall,
The Employee as Corporate Stakeholder: Exploring the Relationship Between Jewish
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On the other hand, Jewish law requires that employees discharge
their responsibilities faithfully and non-negligently.24 Certainly, an
employee may not accept a bribe or kickback in exchange for taking or
recommending an action that is not in the employer's best interest.
25
Jewish law rules regarding privacy restrict the actions of everyone,
including employers and employees. Consequently, employers must not
reveal personal information obtained from their employees (or their
customers),26  and employees may not disclose confidential or
proprietary information obtained from their employers.27 Therefore, a
current or former employee would not be permitted to reveal any of the
employer's secrets, whether or not such information was protected by
secular law.
Jewish law also forbids one from harming someone directly or
indirectly and requires that a person take effective steps to ensure that
his or her property does not injure anyone. 8 Consequently, one may not
sell defective products that would cause such damage.29 Similarly, an
employer must take steps to ensure that the workplace is safe.3" To the
extent that a corporation, or corporate property, may be considered the
property of individuals, as is discussed in Part II below, this rule may
hold such individuals accountable for corporate conduct.
Tradition and Contemporary Business Ethics, in JEWISH BUSINESS ETHICS: THE FIRM
AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS 59-62 (Aaron Levine & Moses Pava, eds., 1999); THE
PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, at 317-18 (Menachem Elon ed.).
24. WAGSCHAL, supra note 16, at 40-41; EHRMAN, supra note 19, at 347.
25. WAGSCHAL, supra note 16, at 40-41.
26. LEVINE, supra note 6, at 68-71, 74.
27. See, e.g., MEIR TAMARI, THE CHALLENGE OF WEALTH, at 102-03 (arguing that
the employee would be stealing such goods, and that anyone paying for such
information would be guilty of purchasing stolen goods and strengthening the hands of
the wrongdoing employee).
28. See supra text accompanying note 13; see also infra note 29.
29. RAKOVER, supra note 12, at 32.
30. YONATON UZZIEL, MISHPATEI UZZIEL IV, Hoshen Mishapt 43 (Heb.). Cf
Deuteronomy 22:8.
686 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
An individual's responsibility as to the wrongdoing of others
Under Jewish law, not only is a person forbidden to violate the rules
himself or herself, a person is also biblically proscribed from taking any
action that would enable someone else to transgress Jewish law.3' In
addition, even if a person's help is not necessary in order for someone
else to contravene Jewish law, providing such help is rabbinically
proscribed.32 Thus, one may not sell weapons to those who would
misuse them to harm others.33 Professionals - such as attorneys - should
not assist clients to accomplish objectives that violate Jewish law.3 4 Nor
may one persuade someone to reveal corporate secrets, because such
disclosure is proscribed by Jewish law.
Even simply encouraging a violation is banned.35  Thus, it is
forbidden to offer someone's agent a bribe in exchange for accepting
one's contractual offer rather than a more favorable offer made by a
competitor. Similarly, buying stolen goods is prohibited because doing
so encourages the thief to steal again.36 Indeed, some Jewish law
authorities outlaw doing any business with a known thief because, by
benefiting the thief through the business transaction, one strengthens the
thief s hands.37 Based on this argument, Jewish law might forbid a
corporation - and the individuals acting on behalf of the corporation -
from transacting business with a corrupt and oppressive government or
business because doing so might strengthen the hands of such
wrongdoers.38
In fact, under Jewish law, a person is affirmatively obliged to
31. This is based on Talmudic interpretation of the verse, "Thou shalt not curse the
deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind." Leviticus 19:14 (King James
Version). See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Kiddushin 32a; see also TAMARI, supra
note 27, at 39-44.
32. See TAMARI, supra note 27, at 39-44.
33. MAIMONIDES, supra note 6, Hilkhot Rotzeakh 12:12 (Heb.).
34. Steven H. Resnicoff, Helping a Client Violate Jewish Law: A Jewish Lawyer's
Dilemma, in H.G. Sprecher (ed.), JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES X, at 191-227.
35. Id.
36. See RAKOVER, supra note 12, at 91-102.
37. Id.
38. See Walter S. Wurzburger, Covenantal Morality in Business, in JEWISH
BUSINESS ETHICS: THE FIRM AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS, supra note 23, at 39.
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admonish a wrongdoer and to attempt to convince him or her to desist. 3
The commentators explain that if a person fails to provide such
admonishment in a situation in which it would have been successful, it is
as if that person were guilty of the same crime the wrongdoer commits.4"
Suppose a person neither enables, assists or encourages another to
commit a wrong. In fact, assume the person earnestly remonstrates with
the wrongdoer and endeavors to dissuade him or her from transgressing,
but these efforts are unavailing. The person is not permitted to stop
there. If the wrongdoer perseveres and the wrong would harm someone,
whether physically, financially or spiritually, a person who knows the
wrongdoer's intention must affirmatively act to restrain the wrongdoer
or to warn the prospective victim. A person is not allowed to "stand idly
by"'41 while someone suffers harm.
To a large extent, secular law embraces the notion of role-
differentiated morality based on one's occupation or profession. For
example, even if an ordinary person might be morally expected to
disclose information to prevent someone from victimizing another, in
many United States jurisdictions an attorney or accountant is not
typically expected to reveal a client's confidences to stop the client from
perpetrating a fraud.42 Indeed, an attorney or accountant who did so
39. YONAH GERONDI, SEFER HA-YIREH, Parshat Kedoshim at 78 (Heb.); RABBI
YEHUDAH HE-HAsID, SEFER HASIDIM, simon 5 (Heb.).
40. Id.
41. Leviticus 19:16.
42. Compare Professional Responsibility Standards Rules and Statutes 29-32 (John
S. Dzienkowski ed., abr. ed. 2002-03) with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which imposes an
affirmative duty on both attorneys who practice before the SEC and accountants to
reveal client fraud. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L. 204; 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. Titles 15 and 18, the
accompanying regulation is cited as 17 C.F.R. 205.3 [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley]
The Model Rules, adopted by many jurisdictions, now mirror Sarbanes-Oxley in this
respect. The American Bar Association amended Model Rule 1.6 to include two
financial harm exceptions to confidentiality and Model Rule 1.13 to incorporate a
mandatory up-the-ladder reporting process that includes the possible revelation of
confidential information under certain very strict circumstances and the possibility of
withdrawal. Codified in the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility in Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Model Rules
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could be sanctioned for violating applicable rules of "professional
ethics. 43
Jewish law rejects the proposition that one's vocation alters one's
fundamental ethical duties. By choosing a particular job, a person may
assume additional responsibilities - of loyalty or diligence - to clients or
employers, but these additional responsibilities are limited; they cannot
supplant pre-existing Jewish law responsibilities to protect prospective
victims.
In part, this means that no person can justify violation of Jewish law
responsibilities by saying that he or she is acting as an agent for
someone else (including a corporation)." Nor can someone successfully
contend that less exacting ethical rules apply because some secular code
purportedly trumps the dictates of Jewish law. A corporate employee
may not employ misleading marketing methods, a corporate salesperson
may not engage in improper persuasion, a corporate negotiator may not
resort to bribery, a corporate manager may not impermissibly discipline,
terminate or otherwise maltreat an employee, and a debt collector may
not engage in oppressive tactics. Nor, of course, may any of these
people knowingly facilitate or enable the corporation to foist a harmful
product on an innocent public, knowingly sell a dangerous product to
someone who will misuse it, or enable or facilitate someone else's
violation of Jewish law. Anyone who witnesses others engaged in such
actions must attempt to stop them. If such efforts are unsuccessful, the
person may have to serve as a whistleblower, if necessary, to prevent
such behavior.
An individual's duties to affirmatively help others
We have already noted the duty not to stand idly by while a person
suffers a loss. In addition, Jewish law imposes affirmative
responsibilities to help others. For example, each individual Jew is
of Professional Conduct and Other Selected Standards (Including California & New
York Rules) on Professional Responsibility, Foundation Press, New York, New York
(2004).
43. See Dzienkowski, supra note 42, at 11.
44. See Wurzburger, supra note 38, at 31.
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obliged to engage in acts of kindliness and charity. One of the highest
forms of charity is to provide someone with the ability to earn a living.45
The duty to engage in charity and other financial kindnesses includes
giving money to the sick and the needy and making non-interest loans.
The precise parameters of these obligations are complex.4 6
Nevertheless, income derived directly or indirectly from a corporation -
whether it be as dividends, from employment compensation, or profits
from stock sales, etc. - will be factored into the calculus.
In addition, there are certain scenarios, including commercial cases,
in which Jewish law requires people to do more than the strict letter of
the law would otherwise demand. Thus, in one case, the Talmud not
only rules that an employer could not hold his employees financially
accountable for damage they had negligently done to his property, but
requires the employer to pay the employees' wages.47
Communal responsibilities for social welfare
Jewish law imposes a number of responsibilities on the community
as a whole, which relate to the concept of "social responsibility,"
broadly defined.48  For example, the public bears collective
responsibility for the provision of the basic needs of the impoverished. 4
Thus, every city is obliged to appoint officials to collect and distribute
funds to the impoverished.50 Historically, Jewish communities have
responded to these responsibilities by the creation of a multitude of
public and private institutions that have provided a panoply of services.
The community can impose taxes for publicly provided services.
A number of communal responsibilities require the regulation of
45. MAIMONIDES, supra note 6, atHilkhotMat'notAniyim 10:7-14 (Heb.).
46. See generally MAASER KESAFIM (Cyril Domb ed.); EHRMAN, supra note 19, at
443-95.
47. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 83a. See generally LEVINE, supra note 6, at
258-62.
48. Thus, the Jewish nation as a whole are enjoined to be "a kingdom of priests and
a holy people." Exodus 19:6. See Wurzburger, supra note 38, at 28.
49. MAIMONIDES, supra note 6, at Hilkhot Mat'not Aniyim 9:1-3 (Heb.).
50. Id.
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commerce. Through its rabbinic court, for instance, each municipality is
required to appoint officials to inspect and verify the accuracy of the
weights and scales utilized by local storekeepers and, should such
measures be found deficient, to sanction the storekeepers involved.5
Similarly, communal authorities are responsible for the fixing of prices
for basic commodities, while allowing the market to establish prices for
luxury items.52 In addition, the community is authorized to enact
general legislation, including commercial regulations, to promote the
general welfare. 3 Throughout Jewish history, such communal powers
were used significantly to promote socially responsible business
practices. Theoretically, such powers could be used to control modern
corporate conduct.
Dramatic sociological changes, however, have caused the collapse
of almost all Jewish communal self-governing structures. Therefore, as
a practical matter, Jewish law's rules regarding communally imposed
controls are unlikely, at least for the immediate future, to impact
corporate conduct in any meaningful way.
PART II: DOES THE CORPORATE CONSTRUCT INVOLVE SPECIAL RULES
REGARDING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT?
Jewish law authorities do not agree as to how, as a matter of Jewish
law, a corporation is to be perceived.54 Secular law largely regards a
corporation as a distinct "legal entity," separate and apart from its
shareholders. A strong argument can be made that Jewish law would
regard corporations as legal entities because Jewish law seems to adopt
the legal entity model in several contexts.55 Nevertheless, there is
relatively little reason to believe that Jewish law would impose any
particular social responsibilities on such corporate entities. The burden
51. Id. at Hilkhot G'neivah 8:20.
52. Id. at Hilkhot Mekhirah 14:1-2; CARO, supra note 9, at 231:27 (Heb.).
53. MAIMONIDES, supra note 6, at Hilkhot Mekhirah 14:1-2 (Heb.).
54. For a comprehensive examination of how the secular and the Jewish legal
systems regard modem corporations, see Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff,
Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L.
REv. 1685, 1687 (1997).
55. Id. at 1748-53.
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to prove the existence of such duties, and the extent thereof, would
appear to be on those who would assert their existence. But no
persuasive effort to carry such a burden of proof has yet been made.
In any event, the majority of Jewish law authorities seem to reject
the corporate entity approach. Instead, they characterize a corporation,
for purposes of Jewish law, as a type of partnership. One view considers
all shareholders to be partners, while another treats only the owners of
voting shares as partners. A third perspective contends that only those
possessing enough shares to have meaningful input into corporate
decision-making are partners. 6
If, under Jewish law, a corporation is a partnership, what are the
implications regarding socially responsible corporate behavior? As
discussed in Part I, above, Jewish law will profoundly affect what each
person involved with the corporation may (or must) do in his or her
daily role as employee, manager, director, or shareholder. In this way,
Jewish law will promote socially responsible corporate action.
The question, however, arises as to how much discretion, if any,
corporate actors enjoy under Jewish law to expend corporate assets for
purposes they believe to be socially desirable if doing so is inconsistent
with the goal of maximizing the partner's profits. After all, these
individuals do not personally own these corporate assets. Instead, they
serve as agents for the true owners, who, under Jewish law, would be the
"partners."
Based on a few specific Jewish law precedents, Professor Aaron
Levine argues that Jewish law requires that an agent in a business
venture must act to maximize its principal's profit.5 7 Although it is
possible to question one or more specific steps in his analysis, his
conclusion would in any event logically flow from the basic principle of
Jewish agency law: an agent must act in the manner desired by the
principal. In the context of a for-profit corporation - as opposed to a
56. Id. at 1695.
57. Aaron Levine, Epilogue to JEWISH BusINESS ETHICS: THE FIRM AND ITS
STAKEHOLDERS, supra note 6, at 273-77.
692 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
charitable or other not-for-profit corporation - the agent, absent clear
instructions to the contrary, should assume that the principal desires him
to maximize profits, subject, of course, to all applicable Jewish law
constraints. This, of course, is the same principle underlying classical
secular corporation theory: that the corporation and its agents are to
serve the profit-maximization goals of the corporate shareholders.
For various reasons, however, secular theorists have argued that a
corporation ought to be perceived in a different way, one which would
allow (or perhaps require) corporate decision-makers to act in light of
factors other than profit maximization. Specifically, they have
contended that such decision-makers should take into account the best
interests of other groups ("stakeholders"), such as corporate employees,
managers, suppliers and affected communities.
There are two interesting things regarding those favoring this
approach. First, many may have espoused it not for the purpose of
promoting a socially responsible agenda but, instead, in order to create a
smokescreen behind which an existing corporate management could take
steps to ward off a prospective takeover.5" Second, they have not relied
on the courts to "find" that the law "naturally" permits corporate
managers to consider non-profit factors. Instead, they have relied on
state legislatures to enact statutes that specifically authorize such
consideration.
As mentioned at the end of Part I above, Jewish communal
enactments could regulate business and, theoretically, could impose
special social responsibilities on a corporation. Nevertheless, as
mentioned at the end of Part I, sociological developments have
devastated Jewish self-governing institutions. As a result, Jewish law
currently lacks the legislative process that would allow it to move in this
direction.
Of course, it is possible that, in particular cases, pursuing socially
desirable goals would be consistent with profit-maximization.
Corporate decision-makers would presumably be justified in taking such
58. Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder
Statutes, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 823, 831 (2003).
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actions if they were correctly convinced that they would also lead to
profit maximization. It is, however, difficult to determine what
objective evidence might be sufficient to support such a belief.
Wherever such evidence fell short, the profit-maximization motive
would have to be followed.
In addition, if the corporate principals would expressly authorize
their agents to pursue non-profit maximizing objectives, the agents could
do so. As a practical matter, however, this raises two important
questions. The first is whether such agreement would have to be
unanimous, as Levine contends.5 9 Such an express consensus is unlikely
to be achieved. The second question asks who, exactly, are the
principals who must agree. As already discussed, Jewish law authorities
disagree as to which shareholders are to be regarded as partners.
There are, however, possible exceptions to the basic rule that
corporate decisions be governed by profit-maximization, and they
involve two of the controversial mechanisms, mentioned above, through
which Jewish law may be supplemented. The first, Dina de-Malkhuta
Dina,60 provides that secular law can, in certain circumstances, be valid
under Jewish law. Consequently, specific secular law requirements,
many of which may be perceived as socially responsible, must be
fulfilled irrespective of the profit motive. If a state has a statute (a
"stakeholder statute") that requires corporate decision-makers to act for
purposes other than profit-maximization and Dina de-Malkhuta Dina
applied to the statute, such conduct would be justified under Jewish law.
On the other hand, if a state has a statute that merely permits corporate-
decision makers to pursue socially responsible objectives, it is arguably
less clear whether such permission would be enough under Jewish law
to justify deviation from profit-maximization policies. This would
depend on a detailed inquiry into the Dina de-Malkhuta Dina doctrine
that exceeds the purview of this paper. It is noteworthy that while most
states have some form of stakeholder statute, most statutes are limited to
certain scenarios and virtually all merely permit, and do not require, that
59. Levine, supra note 57, at 277.
60. See Broyde and Resnicoff, supra note 54, at 1696.
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interests other than profit-maximization be considered. -
The second mechanism is commercial custom, Minhag ha-
Soharim.62  Under Jewish law, corporations must comply with
established commercial customs, including those that require socially
responsible actions (such as those pertaining to employee benefits).
Moreover, if there were an established custom entitling corporate
decision-makers to devote corporate assets to what they regard as
socially desirable purposes, then this custom may be valid as a matter of
Jewish law. Persons investing in corporations may be regarded as
having notice of the custom and as having implicitly consented to it. In
jurisdictions in which there are state stakeholder statutes, such statutes
support the argument that there is such notion and implicit consent.63
Indeed, it has been argued that such a custom in fact exists and is valid
under Jewish law.64 Levine, for one, seems less sanguine as to this
conclusion.65
In summary, Dina de-Malkhuta Dina and Minhag ha-Soharim
require adherence to specific secular laws and customs, whether they are
socially "responsible" or socially neutral. In addition, they also may
justify a corporate decision-maker's decision to utilize corporate assets
to pursue other, unspecified objectives which the decision-maker regards
as socially responsible.
CONCLUSION
Jewish law comprehensively controls corporate conduct from
within by imposing pervasive rules on the actions that corporate
employees, managers, directors, and shareholders may and must take.
These rules prevent a panoply of socially irresponsible actions and
require many affirmatively responsible deeds. Jewish law theoretically
authorizes and, as to some matters, requires, Jewish communities to
legislate additional measures to regulate commercial conduct. But
61. See Hale, supra note 58, at 837.
62. See Broyde and Resnicoff, supra note 54, at 1763.
63. Levine, supra note 57, at 289.
64. Wurzburger, supra note 38, at 42-43.
65. Levine, supra note 57, at 289-90.
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sociological circumstances have, at least for the present, made this
mechanism ineffective.
Jewish law does to a large extent recognize the validity of secular
law. Consequently, the secular political process remains a viable way to
impose socially responsible duties on corporations from without.
Similarly, Jewish law regards commercial customs as binding. As a
result, this process - albeit less formal, less structured and less
controllable than legislation - also represents a viable method for
creating additional social responsibilities for corporations.
Notes & Observations
